


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CIA/SAVA /WIND 720702



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 22 July 1972*

**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**







*For the President Only*

~~Top Secret~~


# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

APRIL 1972 — JULY 1972  
Weekly data as reported


1968-1972  
Weekly average for each month




**US BATTLE DEATHS** increased to 9 from last week's 8.




**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS** decreased to 427 from the 515 of last week. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE** include one regular and five special purpose groups with 532 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for Cambodia - South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 is now some 126,500 - 128,500.




**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS** rose to 625 from the 408 of last week.



**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION** dropped from last week's 2,871 to 1,949.



**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS** as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces declined to 86% from the previous week's 89%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

25X1D1a

In South Vietnam, combat continued throughout the week in the vicinity of Quang Tri city with the initiative remaining in the hands of the South Vietnamese. At the end of the week, NVA forces still controlled the Citadel, although friendly forces were systematically proceeding with careful efforts to neutralize the remaining enemy defenders in this strong point. Elsewhere in northern MR 1, [REDACTED]

NSA

[REDACTED] the Communists are continuing their efforts to bolster their forces, and have moved additional elements of three NVA divisions into the area.\* The ARVN in northern MR 1 is now spread thinly and plans have been made, but not yet implemented, to bring up the 7th Division from MR 4 as a reinforcement reserve. At the same time, the North Vietnamese forces have been constantly battered by air attacks, artillery, and naval gunfire. The sum of the evidence clearly suggests that a major battle -- or series of battles stretching from west of Quang Tri City to southwest of Hue -- is shaping up. Farther south in MR 1, elements of the NVA 711th Division, apparently rested and refitted, staged a successful though costly assault against an ARVN installation near Que Son, a district capital which has been a Communist objective for some time. In the rest of the Republic, enemy activity continues at a fairly light level.

In northern Laos, friendly ground forces have not yet reached an enemy gun position from which the Long Tieng valley has been shelled several times in recent weeks. Poor weather, plus other requirements for tactical air support, have hampered the effort to knock out the gun, but fresh troops have been brought in to renew the ground offensive. The Long Tieng support base at Ban Son has been so badly flooded that it has been necessary to move the facilities to Vang Vieng, 53 kilometers to the southwest of Long Tieng and 110 kilometers north of Vientiane on Route 13. In south Laos, government troops committed to the Kong Sedone clearing operation have made some gains but substantial enemy forces are dug in and obviously intend to try to hold their ground. The government clearing operation along the highway south of Pakse, however, has succeeded in opening up much of that area.

In Cambodia, enemy-initiated action was very light. At the week's end, ARVN units finally moved into Kompong Trabek on Route 1 between the South Vietnamese border and Phnom Penh, meeting little resistance.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics25X1D1a  
NSA

During the past week, only 532 personnel were added to this season's enemy infiltration totals. The estimate of NVA infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1971 now stands at 126,500-128,500. [REDACTED] however, reflect continuing movements of NVA personnel through the North Vietnamese panhandle. On 19 July, a way station near Vinh reported that it had begun a "campaign of transporting troops on a very large scale." While this may be a reference to the heavy flow of replacement personnel reported last week, it is more likely an indication of movement toward the DMZ of additional elements of the 312th NVA Division (one regiment of which is already in Quang Tri Province).

In North Vietnam, the Communists continue to be able to move some supplies -- in amounts which we cannot as yet quantify -- southward from the Chinese border. Recent public statements from Hanoi, however, have shown considerable concern about the difficult and unexpected tasks resulting from heavy bomb damage to the transportation system, the condition of the dike system, possible recurrence of last year's disastrous floods, and the importance of increasing food production. A recent mobilization order appears to be designed to prepare the way for a rapid call-up of labor to cope with these problems.

\*The three divisions are the 325th, the 312th (which was in heavy combat in Laos from December through mid April), and the 320B. The last division generates a certain measure of confusion, since it is essentially a training division that bears a designation similar to that of the line 320th NVA Division, now in the B-3 Front area of MR 2. As the 320B is likely to be composed mostly of green recruits with only a sprinkling of combat tested officers and non-commissioned officers, it initially may be expected to be only marginally effective when sent into action. There are now only two divisional entities in the North Vietnamese Army not committed to out-of-country actions: the 330th and the 350th. Both of these

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